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Abstract 
 
In this paper we build a quality-augmented version of an economic geography model where 
consumers have heterogenous tastes for a set of manufacturing varieties. We discuss a 
footloose capital model and a footloose entrepreneur model. We show that firms selling the 
goods with higher values select the region hosting the largest number of consumers. Larger 
countries thus get better access to the higher quality products. We also show that the effect 
of spatial selection on firms' spatial distribution crucially depends on the properties of the 
taste distribution across varieties. Finally, we show that taste heterogeneity smooths the 
agglomeration patterns but that it should be considered neither as a dispersion force nor as 
an agglomeration force. Indeed, the introduction of taste heterogeneity makes an initially 
dispersed economy less dispersed and an initially agglomerated economy less 
agglomerated. 
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1 Introduction
Many economists like to think that the world is homogenous. But it is not. In particular,
rms tend to specialize in product niches with unequal success. In some niches, rms are able
to sell high value products whereas in other niches they can only o¤er lower value products
to their consumers. Firms therefore turn out to be heterogenous with respect to demand
for their specic products; that is, with respect to the consumers taste for the specic
characteristic of their products. Heterogeneity in demand and taste is known to impact on
the structure of trade. Indeed, exporting rms are known to quote di¤erent export prices
and to o¤er goods with higher values (e.g. Baldwin and Harrigan, 2008; Foster et al. 2008).
However this type of heterogeneity is also likely to impact on rmslocation and therefore on
the regional composition of industries. It is likely that large regions and cities host a larger
share of production and rms but also that they produce goods with higher value and higher
demand. Conversely, peripheral regions are prone to host a smaller share of production and
to produce goods with lower value.
The present paper studies the e¤ect of taste and demand heterogeneity on rmstrade
and location. In particular, it is concerned with the role of the size of countries (cities, or
regions) on the spatial distribution of rms and product varieties. It is well-know that rms
mobility fosters discrepancies in economic activity (see Krugman 1991). It is however less
clear whether and how rmsmobility fosters discrepancies in the value of goods supplied
by regions. This is precisely the focus of the present paper: Do high value added rms
self-select in some countries, giving a quality premium or a value added premium for those
countries? Does such heterogeneity exacerbate or reduce the home market e¤ect, according
to which the share of rms is larger than the share of consumers in the larger region? Does
the distribution of taste and demand across rmsproduct varieties have a signicant impact
on the spatial distribution of rms?
In this paper we build a quality-augmented version of Ottaviano et al. s (2002) model
where consumers have heterogenous tastes for a set of manufacturing varieties. As in Syver-
son (2008), the linear properties of the demand system of this model are particularly well
suited for such an analysis. As is usual in the literature, each rm produces a distinct
variety, competes under monopolistic competition and chooses its location in one of two
countries. We envisage a footloose capital model and a footloose entrepreneurs model. In
the footloose capital model, all consumers are immobile and capitalists allocate their capital
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to countries o¤ering the highest return to capital. In the footloose entrepreneur model, rms
are run by mobile entrepreneurs (or skilled workers) who choose the location that o¤ers
the best outcome in terms of earnings and consumer surplus. Because entrepreneurs move
with their rms, the demand for manufacturing varieties follows the rmsmovement and
creates a demand linkage. In each set up, we derive the price equilibrium conditions and the
rmslocation equilibrium conditions. We then discuss the impact of the taste and demand
distributions on the location equilibrium.
We obtain the following results. In both models, we rstly show that rms selling the
goods with higher demand and higher value select the region hosting the largest number of
consumers. As a result, larger countries do not only get a better access to more varieties as
usually emphasized in the economic geography literature but they also get a better access
to the products for which their consumers put a higher value. We secondly show that the
skewness of the consumers taste distribution has an important e¤ect on the home market
e¤ect. A home market e¤ect exists if a countrys share of industry is more than proportional
than its share of population. We show that, in the footloose capital model, the introduction
of taste heterogeneity reduces the home market e¤ect only if the taste distribution is skewed
towards high taste varieties. That is, if the economy does not include too many highly
demanded varieties. We further investigate the impact of changes in the taste distribution
and show that such changes have ambiguous e¤ects. Those results therefore suggest that the
taste distribution is an important determinant of the location pattern and that it is should
not be neglected in the theoretical and empirical work where taste and cost distributions are
often assumed for their convenient analytical properties.1
We thirdly show that, in the footloose entrepreneur model, the taste distribution has
important consequences on the number of an equilibrium, on the impact of trade costs
and on the possibilities of catastrophic changes. We indeed establish the condition for a
unique location equilibrium, a condition that crucially depends on the taste distribution.
We also show that heterogeneity smoothens catastrophic agglomeration processes because
the introduction of taste heterogeneity eliminates the possibilities of catastrophic changes.2
1Cabral and Mata (2001) study the distribution of rm size in more depth.
2Such a result about the impact of heterogeneity is not uncommon. For instance, it is well-know in the
Industrial Organization literature that the dramatic outcome of Bertand price competition is smoothened
by the introduction of consumer heterogeneity as done in the Hotelling model. Indeedhomogeneous agent
simultaneously change their decision whereas heterogeneous agents change their strategies for di¤erent pa-
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Finally, we show that taste heterogeneity should be considered neither as a dispersion force
nor as an agglomeration force (e.g. see Baldwin and Okubo 2006). Indeed, compared to
the homogenous taste model, the introduction of heterogeneity has ambiguous e¤ects on the
dispersion and agglomeration of rms. In particular, the introduction of taste heterogeneity
makes an initially dispered economy less dispersed and an initially agglomerated economy
less agglomerated. It is a force that entices entrepreneurs to agglomerate partially. These
results open an interesting empirical question about the impact on rms location of the
taste distributions across manufacturing varieties.
The paper is structured as it follows. The remaining part of this introduction presents
a deeper review of the literature. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 and 4 derive the
spatial selection and the location equilibria in footloose capital and footloose entrepreneur
models under taste heterogeneity. Section 5 extends the model to the simple case where
higher taste and higher demand products are more expensive to produce. Section 6 concludes.
Related literature This paper is closely related to two strands of the International Trade
literature on product quality and trade composition and on rmsheterogeneity. The rst
strand traditionally discusses vertical di¤erentiation models in which higher quality products
are more likely to be consumed and produced in high wage countries (Linden 1961, Falvey
1981, Falvey and Kierzkowski 1987 and Flam and Helpman 1987, Stockey 1991).3 Murphy
and Shleifer (1997) develop a model where high quality products end up being produced
in high human capital countries. More recently, Feenstra and Romalis (2006) extend the
Heckscher Ohlin model to product qualities. In contrast to our paper, none of those models
study the (re-)location of rms. The relationship between product quality and location
choice has remained an open research question. On the other hand, empirical studies show
that the quality or the value of goods plays a crucial and important role in international
trade pattern. For instance, using US commodity trade data, Schott (2004) nds that the
rameter or variable values.
3Falvey (1981) models di¤erent endowments. As a consequence, he nds that capital abundant country
exports capital-intensive high quality products whereas it imports labor-intensive low quality products.
Then, Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) added technology di¤erence to dissimilar factor endowments. Flam
and Helpman (1987) use a Ricardian technology di¤erence to model quality trade. Stockey (1991) suggests
that consumers in the rich country consume more of the same quality products than consumers in the poor
country.
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unit value of trade within one product line is higher for high-wage countries. Hummels and
Klenow (2005) nd that richer countries export higher value goods. Hallak (2006) nds that
rich countries import relatively more from the countries producing high quality goods.4 To
sum up, while there exist quantitative evidence of heterogeneity of product quality in the
trade patterns, the analysis of the relationship between product quality and rmslocation
has been unexplored until the present contribution
The second strand of literature related to this paper concerns rmscost heterogeneity
(Melitz, 2003; Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004; Falvey et al., 2004; Melitz and Otta-
viano, 2008; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2008; Okubo, 2008). This literature responds to
extensive empirical research on trade behavior at rm level5 and focuses on the impact of
trade liberalization on the average productivity and on the trade behaviors of rms with
heterogenous productivity. Yet, cost heterogeneity is not the only critical characteristic that
explains trade patterns. For some authors, trade is better explained by demand or quality
heterogeneity than by cost heterogeneity (see Foster et al. 2008). Indeed, trade data suggest
a positive correlation between product prices and exporting status of rms, which conrms
the premise according to which exporting rms produce better quality or more demanded
goods and which invalidates the idea that exporting rms have lower costs (see Baldwin
2005, Greenaway 1995 and Greenaway et al. 1995; Fukao et al. 2003; Okubo, 2007). So, a
deeper investigation of the impact of demand and quality heterogeneity is welcome.
We note that our investigation on the quality or taste heterogeneity is not entirely new.
Currently, Baldwin and Harrigan (2008) and Khandelwal (2007) study heterogeneous quality
in international trade models. However, none of those papers study the issue of the rms
location and the self-selection of rms according to the value and/or the quality of their
products. Instead, our paper is in line of economic geography models that discuss the
relocation of rms between regions. We discuss the possibility of rmsspatial selection, in
which high quality rms agglomerate in the large market and low quality rms locate in the
small market. We furthermore pay careful attention to the way the value, the quality or the
4Hummels and Klenow (2005) use import data from 76 countries at the six digit level of the Harmonized
System and then nd that the quality margin is a function of the exporter size. Hallak (2006) analyzes
bilateral trade ows among 60 countries.
5Many empirical studies give evidence on the relationship between trade and rm productivity through
trade liberalization. See Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2004),
Pavcnik (2002) and Tybout and Westbrook (1995).
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taste for varieties is distributed across rms. Our geography model on heterogeneous quality
extends the currently emerging trade literature on rm heterogeneity (Foster et al. 2008).
2 The model
Our model extends the framework of Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Ottaviano and Thisse
(2004) by allowing for heterogenous tastes. In this section, we present the basic model and
characterize the product market outcome for any given organizational structure and spatial
distribution of rms.
2.1 Preferences
Consider a world with two countries, labeled H and F . Variables associated with each
country will be subscripted accordingly. We assume that there is a mass L of consumers,
with a share 1=2  H < 1 located in country H. In what follows, we refer to H as the large
and to F as the small country.
All consumers in country i = H;F have identical quasi-linear preferences over a homoge-
nous good and a continuum of horizontally di¤erentiated varieties, indexed by v 2 V  [0; 1].
As in Ottaviano et al. (2002), the utility of a representative agent in country i is given by
the following quadratic function:
Ui =
Z
V
b(v)qi(v)dv      
2
Z
V
[qi(v)]
2dv   
2
Z
V
qi(v)dv
2
+ qoi ; (1)
where qi(v) denotes the consumption of variety v in country i and qoi stands for the con-
sumption of the homogenous good in that same country. As in Ottaviano et al. (2002),  is
a measure of the degree of substitution between varieties whereas     (> 0) measures the
consumer bias toward a more dispersed consumption of varieties.
The new element in this model is the function b(v) : V ! [; ] ; 0 <   , that
measures the willingness to pay for variety v.6 Willingness to pay is heterogenous and reects
the intensity of consumers preferences for each di¤erentiated product v with respect to the
homogenous good. Without loss of generality we assume that varieties are ranked according
to the consumerswillingness to pay, i.e. such that v > v0 () b(v) > b(v0). Because
6In the spirit of Baldwin and Harrigan (2008) b(v) can be called as the quality of variety v. We will have
a closer look at this interpretation in Section 5.
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there is a unit mass of varieties, the inversion of the function b yields the taste cumulative
distribution : F : [; ] ! [0; 1]; F(x) =Proba[v : b(v)  x] = b 1(x). The taste
distribution density is then the function f : [; ] ! R; f(x) = F 0(x) = 1=[b0(b 1(x))].
Because of this close relationship, we will refer to b as the taste (function) and to F and f
as the taste cumulative distribution and the taste distribution density across varieties. Note
nally that the consumers have identical preferences: there is no priori regional preferences
(as in Tabuchi and Thisse (2001)) or local preferences (e.g. Mossay, 2006). Using this
vocabulary, we therefore call the average taste the parameter   RV b(v)dv.
Each agent maximizes his/her utility (1) subject to his/her budget constraint:Z
V
pi(v)qi(v)dv + poi q
o
i  wi + qo; (2)
where pi(v) denotes the consumer price of variety v; wi stands for the wage in country
i = H;F . Following Ottaviano et al. (2002), we assume that consumers own a su¢ ciently
large endowment qo > 0 of the numéraire. Consequently, consumers are not constrained
in their consumption of the di¤erentiated varieties and spend the rest of their income on
the homogenous numéraire good. As a by-product, this eliminates the income e¤ects. As
will become clear in the sequel, free trade in the homogenous good market leads to price
equalization across countries, thus making this good a natural choice for the numéraire
(poi = 1; i = H;F ).
We assume that all varieties are consumed. Maximizing the utility (1) subject to the
budget constraint (2) yields the following rst order condition:
b(v)  (   ) qi(v)   Z
V
qi()d   pi(v) = 0 (3)
Integrating the left hand side of this equality yields the average taste
 = 
Z
V
qi(v)dv +
Z
V
pi(v)dv (4)
The last two expressions allows us to derive the individual demand for variety v as the
following linear formula:
qi(v) = ba(v)  (b+ c) pi(v) + cPi (5)
where
Pi =
Z
V
pi(v)dv
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is the manufacturing price index in country i and where b and c are the following positive
coe¢ cients
b =
1

and c =

 (   ) (6)
The parameter b measures the price sensitivity of demand and the parameter c as the degree
of product di¤erentiation. In particular, when c ! 0 varieties are perfectly di¤erentiated,
whereas they become perfect substitutes when c!1.
In expression (5), the function ba(v) is equal to
ba(v) = b(v) (b+ c)  c (7)
and measures the demand size for variety v. This function is indeed equal to the consumers
demand when all prices are nil. At given prices and average taste, a change in ba(v) fully
reects a change in the taste b(v) of the variety v. Varieties for which consumers express a
high taste have higher demands. For the sake of convenience, the minimum and the maximum
demand size are dened as a  minv ba(v) = (b+ c)+c and a  maxv ba(v) = (b+ c)+c
while the average demand size is dened as
a 
Z
V
ba(v)dv = b
The cumulative distribution of demand size across varieties is equal to the function Fa :
[a; a] ! [0; 1]; Fa(y) =Proba[v : ba(v)  y]. This distribution is related the taste cumulative
distribution by the relationship
F (x) = Fa (x (b+ c)  c) () Fa (y) = F

by + ac
b (b+ c)

It is worth noting that the cumulative distribution of demand size Fa has an empirical content
as this is the distribution that the econometrician is likely to measure. The taste cumulative
distribution F cannot be measured.
To guarantee positive demand size ba(v) > 0; we posit that b(v)= > c= (b+ c) for all v.
So, the preference for the lowest quality should not be too low.
The indirect utility is computed in Appendix 1 as it follows: Vi = Si + wi + qoi where
Si =
8<: a
2
2b
  a RV pi(v)dv + b+c2 RV [pi(v)]2 dv   c2 RV pi(v)dv2
+ var[ba]
2(b+c)
  RV [ba(v)  a]pi(v)dv
If varieties have the same demand size (ba(v) = a), we get back to the Ottaviano et al.s
(2002) consumer surplus.
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2.2 Price equilibrium and trade costs
Production takes place in two sectors. In the rst sector, the homogenous good is produced
under perfect competition using one unit of labor per unit of output. We assume that this
good can be costlessly traded between countries, which implies that its price is internationally
equalized and equal to wages. Normalizing wages to one we get poi = wi = 1 for i = H;F ,
which justies our previous choice of this good as the numéraire.
In the second sector, called the manufacturing sector, each rm produces and sells a single
di¤erentiated manufacturing variety. Let Vi and ni be the set and the mass of manufacturing
rms located in country i. Naturally, we have that ni = (Vi) 
R 1
0
di(v) where (Vi)
is the measure of Vi and i(v) is the measure of variety v if it is produced in country i
(H(v) + F (v) = 1). In this section we derive the price equilibrium for a given location
structure (VH ;VF ) and for a given distribution of taste and demand size across rms (b()).
The demand for each variety in each market depends on the set of varieties produced
domestically and on the set produced abroad. In accord with empirical evidences (e.g., Head
and Mayer, 2000; Haskel and Wolf, 2001), we assume that product markets are segmented.
Firms are hence free to set prices specic to each national market they sell their product in.
The prot of a manufacturing rm established in country i is given by
i(v) = Lipii(v)qii(v) + Lj(pij(v)  )qij(v)  ri(v); v 2 Vi (8)
where L is the total population, i is the share of population in country i, ri(v) is the
remuneration of rm vs xed factors and qij(v) and pij(v) is the price and demand of
variety v when it is produced in country i and consumed in country j. By (5), the individual
demand writes as
qij(v) = ba(v)  (b+ c)pij(v) + cPj
for all i; j 2 fH;Fg. Under monopolistic competition, rms are too small to a¤ect the
aggregate variables. So they set their prices pii(v) and pij(v) taking Pi;Pj and ba() as given.
The optimal prices are computed as it follows:
pii(v) =
ba(v) + cPi
2(b+ c)
and pij(v) = pjj(v) +

2
(9)
which depend on the demand size of the variety o¤ered.
At the equilibrium in the product market, the rms prices (pii(v); pij(v)) are consistent
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with aggregate prices or price indices (Pi;Pj). The latter are successively equal to
Pi =
Z 1
0
pii(v)di(v) +
Z 1
0
pji(v)dj(v)
=
Z 1
0
pii(v)di(v) +
Z 1
0

pii(v) +

2

dj(v)
=
Z 1
0
pii(v)dv +
Z 1
0

2
dj(v)
=
a+ cPi
2(b+ c)
+

2
nj
Solving for the xed point yields
Pi =
a+ (b+ c)nj
2b+ c
(10)
so that equilibrium prices are equal to
pii(v) =
1
2
2a+ njc
2b+ c
+
ba(v)  a
2 (b+ c)
and pij(v) = p

jj(v) +

2
(11)
If varieties have the same specic demand sizes (ba(v) = a), we get back to the Ottaviano
et al.s (2002) prices. Otherwise, the price is larger for any variety that o¤er a higher value
to the consumer. The reader will observe that although the price of a variety depends
specically on the ideosyncratic taste for its own variety, it does not depend on where each
other specic variety is produced. The price of a variety v depends only on the mass of
varieties produced in each country. More formally, we mean that pii(v) depends on (ni; nj)
but not on the sets (Vi;Vj). Indeed, in this model, the import price of a variety is adjusted
to local price up to a constant equal to =2, which does not depend on its demand size. The
contribution of imported varieties in the local price index is therefore equal to =2 times the
mass of the importers, which is independent of any specic demand size. So, prices and price
indices do not depend on the characteristics of each individual rm, but only on the mass
of rms in each country. This independence of prices to the precise composition of local
production turns out to be a useful property in the subsequent analysis of spatial selection.
Given the above prices, it is easy to show that production is equal to qii(v) = (b+c)p

ii(v)
and qij(v) = (b + c)
 
pj(v)  t=2

so that the prot of rm v located in country i can be
written as
i(v) = L(b+ c)

i(p

ii(v))
2 + j

pjj(v) 

2
2
  ri(v) (12)
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Finally to assure that trade remains feasible, we must impose that the consumption for
any variety never falls to zero: minfi;j;vg qij(v) > 0. This is equivalent to the condition:
 <  trade  2a
2b+ c
  a  a
b+ c
=
2b
2b+ c
  (  )
This is satised for a low enough trade cost  and a high enough lower bounds for taste
parameter  and/or demand size a.
In the two following sections, we analyze the footloose capital and entrepreneur models.
3 Footloose capital model
In this section, we consider a footloose capital model where consumerslocation is exoge-
nously given by the population shares (i; j) and where the home country has the largest
population size: H  F = 1 H . In this footloose capital model, a unit mass of capitalists
invest their capital in the rms and collect their prots. More specically, the timing is
as follows. In a rst stage, each immobile capitalist is endowed with a unit of capital that
he/she invests in a variety before knowing the consumers taste for this particular variety.
Varieties are thus alike and capital is randomly spread across varieties. In a second stage,
nature chooses the taste parameter of each variety according to the taste distribution F.
Third, the capitalist sets up a rm and locate it to the country where his/her capital rent
ri(v); i 2 fH;Fg; is the highest. Finally, labor and product markets clear. In accordance
to the literature we dene the location equilibrium in the manufacturing market as the dis-
tribution of rms such that product markets clear and no capital unit can earn a higher
return in another location. Note that, in this model, the absence of income e¤ect implies
that capitalists consume the same set of manufacturing goods as other agents, irrespective
of their actual ideosyncratic rents. The consumption of capitalists is thus simply reported
in the consumersshares (H ; F ).
3.1 Spatial selection and location equilibrium
In a footloose capital model, the equilibrium imposes that the capital rent ri exhausts prots
so that i(v) = 0. The rent di¤erential between the two countries writes as
r(v)  rH(v)  rF (v) = L(b+ c) [H(pHH(v)  =4)  F (pFF (v)  =4)]
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A location equilibrium is therefore a partition of the rms (VH ,VF ) (VH [ VF = [0; 1] and
VH \ VF = ?) such that capital owners do not wish to reallocate their capital. That is, it
requires that r(v)  0 if v 2 VH and r(v)  0 if v 2 VF .
Plugging equilibrium prices in the rent di¤erential we get
r(v; nH) =
L (b+ c)
2 (2b+ c)
2664
(2b+ c) (2H   1) (ba(v)  a)
+ (2a  b) (b+ c) (2H   1)
 c (b+ c) (nH   1=2)
3775 (13)
This rent di¤erential increases with the trade cost  . An increase in the latter rises the
incentives to locate in the country with the largest population. As noted before, the rent
di¤erential of a variety v depends on its demand size ba(v) and on the mass of rms in
the domestic country nH . It does not depend on the spatial distribution of rms and their
production sites (VH ;VF ). As a result, it readily follows that high demand rms are enticed to
self-select into the country with the large population. More formally, 8v; v0, s.t. ba(v) > ba(v0),
we have
H = 1=2 =) r(v; nH) = r(v0; nH)
H > 1=2 =) r(v; nH) > r(v0; nH)
This implies that at a given (H ; nH), if H > 1=2; we encounter three situations: (i)
r(v; nH) > 0 for all v, (ii) r(v; nH) < 0 for all v; or (iii) there exists a variety ev 2 V
such that r(v; nH)  0 i¤ v  ev. The variety ev divides the set of rms between those that
are willing to locate either in country H or F . As a result the spatial selection takes place
according to the demand size of the variety produced by each rm.
Lemma 1 (Spatial selection) If H > 1=2, VH = fv j ba(v) > ba(1 nH)g and VF = VnVH :
Let us dene the function
G(nH) = ba (1  nH)  a = (b+ c) [b (1  nH)  ]
which is decreasing in nH under our monotonicity assumptions on b(v) and which crosses
the zero axis for some nH 2 [0; 1]. Plugging this in the rent di¤erential we get
r(nH)  L (b+ c)
2 (2b+ c)
2664
(2b+ c) (2H   1)G (nH)
+ (2a  b) (b+ c) (2H   1)
 c (b+ c) (nH   1=2)
3775 (14)
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which is a decreasing function of nH .
Given the above lemma, we can deduce that a location equilibrium is represented by the
mass of rms nH 2 [0; 1] such that (i) nH = 1 and r(1) > 0, (ii) nH = 0 and r(0) < 0
or, (iii) nH 2 (0; 1) and r(nH) = 0. Because r decreases with larger nH , the location
equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proposition 2 In the footloose capital model (H > 1=2), a unique equilibrium exists where
high value varieties are produced in the larger country.
We now analyze the impact of the taste distribution F.
3.2 Taste distribution and rmslocation
The rst question we ask is whether the home market e¤ect is larger when varieties are
homogenous. That is, we compare the case where ba(v) is equal to the its constant average
a to the case where ba(v) is not equal to it. In the case of homogenous taste, we have that
G(nH) = 0 and the location equilibrium solves r(noH) = 0 such that
noH   1=2 =
8<: 22a bc (H   1=2) if H < eH  12 2a b+c2a b1 otherwise
This is the Ottaviano and Thisses (2004) result where, by the feasibility trade condition, the
coe¢ cient 22a b
c
is larger than one. Hence a home market e¤ect exists because the larger
country attracts a share of rms that is larger than its share of population.
In the case of taste heterogeneity, G(nH) monotonically decreases in nH and takes value
within the interval [a   a; a   a]. Using expression (14), we observe that when nH 2 (0; 1),
spatial selection reduces the home market e¤ect (nH < n
o
H) if and only if G(n
o
H) < 0, which
is equivalent to the condition ba(1   noH) < a. Since noH > 1=2, this condition is more likely
to be satised if the demand size of variety v, ba(v); increases less rapidly for lower demand
varieties and more rapidly for higher demand varieties. So, the role of spatial selection on
the home market e¤ect relies on the properties of the taste distribution. More precisely,
because the function ba is the inverse of Fa, spatial selection reduces the home market e¤ect
if the cumulative distribution of demand sizes Fa increases less rapidly for highly demanded
varieties, which happens if the distribution density of demand size fa is not too skewed
towards low demand varieties. Since ba (1  nH)   a is proportional to b (1  nH)    we
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can infer from this observation that spatial selection reduces the home market e¤ect if the
taste distribution density f is not too skewed towards low taste varieties. This is shown in
the panel (a) of Figure 1 that presents the graph of the taste cumulative distribution F(x)
(that should be read from the horizontal axis to the vertical axis) and at the same time as
the taste function b(v) (an inverse relationship that should be read from the vertical axis to
the horizontal axis). It is readily seen that b(1  noH) <  when the distribution is not too
skewed towards low taste varieties. Conversely, the panel (b) of Figure 1 displays the case
of a distribution skewed towards low taste varieties so that b(1  noH) > .
Insert Figure 1 here
This argument is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Spatial selection reduces the home market e¤ect (nH < n
o
H) if and only ifb(1 noH) < ; that is, if the taste density distribution f is not too skewed toward low taste
varieties.
It is interesting to discuss the case of symmetric taste distributions, which are unskewed.
Such distributions satisfy F() = 1=2 and F(+ x) = 1  F(  x). Also, b(1=2) =  =
( + )=2 and b(1=2   z) <  < b(1=2 + z) for z 2 [0; 1=2]. Hence, because noH > 1=2, we
get G(noH) = (b+ c) [b(1  noH)  ] < (b+ c) [b(1=2)  ] = 0. Spatial selection therefore
reduces the home market e¤ect under any symmetric taste distributions. This includes
uniform taste distributions. As a result, any taste distribution that is skewed towards high
taste varieties implies that spatial selection reduces the home market e¤ect. This is the case
for log normal and Pareto distributions.
We are now equipped to discuss the impact of the taste distribution on rmsagglom-
eration. To our knowledge, the paper presents for the rst time such results about the
relationship between taste distributions and rmslocation. We concentrate on three types
of changes in the taste distribution. First, let us consider the impact of a parallel shift in
the taste distribution. Suppose that two taste cumulative distributions F 1 and F
2
 so that
F 2(x)  F 1(x   ) 8x 2 [; ] and  > 0. This is shown in the panel (a) of Figure 2
that presents the graph of the taste cumulative distribution F(x) at the same time as the
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inverse relationship ba(v). It naturally comes that b2(v) = b1(v)    and 2 = 1    so
that G1(nH) = (b+ c) [b1(1  nH)  1] is equal to G2(nH) = (b+ c) [b2(1  nH)  2]. So,
a parallel shift in the taste distribution does not alter the location equilibrium. This result
stems from the linear properties of the quadratic utility model we have explored.
Insert Figure 2 here
Proposition 4 A parallel shift in the taste distribution does not alter the location equilib-
rium.
Second let us consider a change in the taste distribution in the sense of rst-order-
stochastic dominance. We here show that such a change has ambiguous e¤ects on the
location of rms. Suppose again that two distributions F 1 and F
2
 so that the second one
has more low taste varieties and so that it rst-order-stochastically dominates the rst one:
F 2(x) > F
1
(x); x 2 [; ]. Such a change in the taste distribution is depicted in the panel
(b) of Figure 2. It naturally comes that b1(v) > b2(v) and 1 > 2. The average taste
and the idiosyncratic taste for a specic variety do not need to move in a parallel way. So,
because rms are likely to change their price and location decisions according to how the
idiosyncratic taste for their products compares to the average taste, this change in the taste
distribution is ambiguous. The overall impact is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 There exists two numbers (n01; n
0
2); 1 > n
0
1 > n
0
2 > 0, such that a rst-order-
stochastic change in the taste distribution F 1 to F
2
 (with F
2
 > F
1
 and 1 > 2) reduces the
number of rms in the large country (nH1 < n

H2) if and only if n

H1 2 [n01; n02].
Proof. See Appendix.
To make things clear, let us consider the case where the taste distribution is not too
skewed toward low taste varieties (see Proposition 3). In this case we know that the spatial
selection reduces the home market e¤ect (G1 < 0). In addition it can be shown that the rst
root n01 does not belong to the interval [0; 1=2]. We thus get the following simpler result. A
rst-order-stochastic change in the taste distribution then reduces the home market e¤ect if
rms are initially not too strongly agglomerated (nH1 < n
0
2, G2 < G1 < 0) and amplies this
e¤ect if they are initially strongly agglomerated (1 > nH1 > n
0
2, G1 < G2 < 0).
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Ultimately we study changes in the taste distribution in the sense of second-order-
stochastic dominance. In other words we ask how a mean-preserving spread of the taste
distribution a¤ects the location equilibrium. There exist many ways to reallocate the con-
sumers taste across varieties while preserving the average taste. To make things simple,
we here focus on what we call an "increase in spread around its mean". In this change
of distribution, the taste parameter is reduced when it lies below the average taste and
is increased when it lies above it. So, varieties with taste parameter below the average a
positive probability to become worse (i.e. F 1(x)  F 2(x) if x < a  a1 = a2) and those
with a taste parameter above the average have a positive probability to become better (i.e.
1  F 1(x) < 1  F 2(x) () F 1(x) > F 2(x) if x > a). This change in the taste distribution
is depicted in panel (c) of Figure 2.
Using this denition and inverting the functions F 1 and F
2
, we readily get that b2(v) <b1(v) () b1(v) < , which is equivalent to G2 < G1 () G1 < 0. So, the above change
in the taste distribution reduces the home market e¤ect if the di¤erence G2(noH) G1(noH) is
negative, which happens again when the distribution density of quality f is not too skewed
toward low taste varieties (G1(noH) < 0).
Proposition 6 An increase in the spread of the taste distribution around its mean reduces
the home market e¤ect if and only if ba(1  noH) < a; that is, if the taste distribution density
f is not too skewed toward low taste varieties.
This result applies to uniform and Pareto taste distributions because they are (weakly)
skewed toward high taste varieties. So, an increase in the spread of those taste distributions
reduces further the home market e¤ect.
4 Footloose Entrepreneur Model
We now discuss the properties of footloose entrepreneur model under taste heterogeneity. Let
us assume now that the unit mass of rms is owned by a unit mass of mobile entrepreneurs
(or skilled workers). The timing is as follows. In a rst stage, each entrepreneur is endowed
with a variety whose taste parameter is drawn from the taste distribution F. In the second
stage, the entrepreneur sets up his/her rm and locates it to the country where his/her
utility Vi; i 2 fH;Fg is the highest. Finally, labor and product markets clear. In this model,
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each entrepreneur does not only consider the rent ri(v) that he/she collects from his/her rm
but also the consumer surplus he/she obtains in his/her country. In addition, we assume a
mass A  (L   1)=2 of immobile consumers in each country; we naturally impose L > 1.
Entrepreneurs and immobile consumers consume in the country they locate so the mass of
consumers in country H (resp. F ) is equal to HL = A+nH (resp. FL = A+nF ). The key
feature of the entrepreneur models lies in the fact the entrepreneurs relocate their purchasing
power when they move with their rms to another country.
4.1 Spatial sorting and location equilibrium
When entrepreneurs consider their location, they contemplate the utility di¤erential between
the two countries. Let us denote the utility di¤erential asV (v) = VH(v) VF (v). A location
equilibrium is then a partition of the entrepreneurs (VH ,VF ) (VH [VF = [0; 1], VH \VF = ?)
such that entrepreneurs do not wish to relocate: V (v)  0 if v 2 VH and V (v)  0 if
v 2 VF .
An entrepreneurs indirect utility is equal to Vi(v) = Si(v) + ri(v) where his/her earning
ri(v) and the consumer surplus Si(v) are given above. Because all entrepreneurs faces the
same purchasing prices, they get the same consumer surplus Si(v)  Si, irrespective of
the consumers idiosyncratic taste for the variety they produce (see Appendix). The utility
di¤erential between entrepreneurs within country i stem only from their earnings ri(v; ni),
which will again depend on the consumers taste for the variety they sell and on the masses
of rms in each country.
As a result we can apply the same spatial selection argument as in the footloose capital
model. The only di¤erence is that H is now endogenous and given by HL = A+(nH 1=2).
Therefore a country that hosts more rms also hosts a larger population, which in turn will
trigger rms selling varieties with high demand and high value products to locate there. So,
we encounter three cases: rst, V (v; nH) > 0 for all v; second, V (v; nH) < 0 for all v;
and nally, if nH > 1=2; there exists a entrepreneur ev 2 [0; 1] such that V (v; nH)  0 if
v  ev. The entrepreneur ev divides the set of entrepreneurs between those that are willing to
locate either in country H or in F . As a result the spatial sorting takes place according to
the quality of the variety produced by each entrepreneur.
Lemma 7 (Spatial sorting) If H > 1=2, VH = fv j ba(v) > ba(1  nH)g and VH = VnVH :
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On the one hand, the entrepreneurs rent can now be written as ri(nH) and his/her
rent di¤erential r(nH) as dened in expression (13). On the other hand, the consumer
surplus can also be written as a function of the mass of entrepreneurs located in each country
(nH ; 1  nH). In Appendix 1 we compute the di¤erential in consumer surplus as
S(nH)  SH   SF = 
2
(2nH   1) (2a  b)

b+ c
2b+ c
2
+

2
M(nH) (15)
where
M(nH) 
Z 1
1 nH
(ba(v)  a) dv = (b+ c)Z 1
1 nH
(b(v)  ) dv  0
Note that M 0(nH) = G(nH) so that the function M(nH) rstly increases from zero, then
attains a maximum at n0H where G(n
0
H) = 0 and then decreases back to zero. Since G(nH)
is a decreasing function, M(nH) is concave function.
The rst term in expression (15) reects the traditional demand linkage found in new
economic geography. Domestic consumers indeed benet from the agglomeration of rms in
their country because they get lower prices on average. The second term in this expression
reects the role of taste heterogeneity and sorting of entrepreneurs. Consumers that belong
to the larger country get access to the varieties they demand more because high demand
entrepreneurs sort out in their country. As a result, taste heterogeneity rises the consumer
surplus in that country and fosters further agglomeration.
Given the above argument, we can specify the entrepreneursutility di¤erential by adding
S(nH) to r(nH) and by using the relationship (2H   1)L = 2nH   1. Let
(nH) M(nH) +G (nH) (2nH   1)
If nH > 1=2, the utility di¤erential depends on the number of rms only, and can be written
as
V (nH) =

4
b+ c
(2b+ c)2
f4a (3b+ 2c)   [2b (3b+ 2c) + Lc (2b+ c)]g (2nH   1) + 
2
(nH)
(16)
If nH < 1=2, the spatial sorting takes place in the other direction and we naturally get
V (nH)   V (1 nH). Because lim"!0+V (1=2+") /M(1=2)> 0> lim"!0+V (1=2 
") /  M(1=2), the function V  has a discontinuity at nH = 1=2. Lemma 7 does not give
any information about the distribution of entrepreneurs in the case where H = 1=2 and
therefore nH = 1=2. Thus, without loss of generality, we simply assume that the distribution
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of entrepreneurs and varieties across countries is random when nH = 1=2. As a consequence,
consumer surpluses are equal everywhere and utility di¤erential is nil: V (1=2) = 0.
The above specication of utility di¤erential allows us to become more precise about
the denition of location equilibria. A location equilibrium is represented by the mass of
entrepreneurs nH 2 [0; 1] such that (i) nH = 1 and V (1) > 0, (ii) nH = 0 and V (0) <
0; or (iii) nH 2 (0; 1) and V (nH) = 0. The latter will be asymptotically stable if any
small deviation from the equilibrium distribution leads back to the equilibrium distribution
according to the following dynamics of entrepreneurs:
dnH
dt
=
8<: V (nH) if nH 2 (0; 1=2) [ (1=2; 1)0 if nH 2 f0; 1=2; 1g
This proves to be true i¤ d (V ) =dnH < 0 at any interior equilibrium location nH 2
(0; 1)nf1=2g. Any corner location equilibrium nH 2 f0; 1g is also stable. Finally, the sym-
metric equilibrium, nH = 1=2, is stable if lim"!0V (1=2 + ") V (1=2  ") < 0, which is
equivalent to lim"!0V (1=2 + ") < 0.
Homogenous taste: It is instructive to begin by the description of the location equi-
librium in the absence of heterogeneity. In that case, there is no sorting and we get
G (nH) = M(nH) = 0 so that V (nH) is proportional to 2nH   1. Therefore, rms will
disperse in symmetric locations, nH = 1=2, if  > 
0 where
 0  4 (3b+ 2c) a
2b (3b+ 2c) + c (2b+ c)L
;
they fully agglomerate in one country, nH 2 f0; 1g; if  <  0; and they can allocate according
to any spatial distribution if  =  0. This is consistent with Ottaviano et al (2002).
In the presence of taste heterogeneity, rms may locate in quite a di¤erent way. Let us
rst check the case of full agglomeration where nH = 1.
Full agglomeration: In this case, we have that HL = A + 1; G(1) = a   a < 0 and
M(1) = 0. So, V (1) > 0 if and only if
4 (2c+ 3b) a   [c (2b+ c)L+ 2b (2c+ 3b)] + 2(2b+ c)
2
b+ c
(a  a) > 0
which yields
 <  sustain   0   2 (a  a) (2b+ c)
2
(b+ c) [c (2b+ c)L+ 2b (3b+ 2c)]
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The threshold  sustain denes the sustain point as the trade cost below which full agglomer-
ation is sustainable. It is equal to  0 when heterogeneity disappears (a! a) and decreases
with any rise in heterogeneity as reected in the value of a   a. So, for  2 ( sustain;  0),
entrepreneurs do not fully agglomerate under taste heterogeneity whereas they fully agglom-
erate under homogenous taste. Taste heterogeneity does not make full agglomeration more
likely.
Symmetric and interior equilibria: Let us now discuss the case of interior equilib-
ria where V (nH) = 0. In the presence of heterogeneity, the symmetric distribution
of entrepreneurs is an equilibrium since V (1=2) = 0. It is however not stable because
lim"!0V (1=2 + ") / 2M(1=2) > 0. If entrepreneurs locate symmetrically, entrepreneurs
producing highly demanded goods have a common incentive to sort out in one country
and thereby to attract more consumers there. A small perturbation in the distribution of
entrepreneurs triggers this e¤ect and some entrepreneurs start agglomerating.
The number of interior equilibria depends on the properties of the function  (nH). Notice
that the latter function is continuous on (1=2; 1], has a positive value at nH ! 1=2 and is
equal to the negative value a  a at nH = 1. Its shape depends on the taste distribution. As
a consequence, the number of roots of V (nH) and the number of equilibria also depend on
this properties of this distribution. Then, we derive the following Proposition. Let en be the
solution of (16).
Proposition 8 Suppose that 5ba0 > ba00, which means that taste function b is not a too convex
function or equivalently that the taste cumulative distribution F is not too concave. Then,
there exist four stable equilibria, two equilibria with full agglomeration (either nH = 1 or
nF = 1) if  < 
sustain and the two equilibria with asymmetric dispersion (either nH = en or
nF = en 2 (1=2; 1)) otherwise. In the latter equilibrium, one country hosts a larger group of
entrepreneurs who produce the more demanded varieties.
Proof. See Appendix.
The condition of this Proposition applies for uniform and Pareto taste distributions
(see Appendix). The traditional view in new economic geography models emphasizes the
role of demand linkages which entice entrepreneurs to agglomerate and which make the
larger country host the production of a wider range of varieties. When consumers taste is
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heterogenous, the demand linkage entices the entrepreneurs producing the best varieties to
locate in the larger market. In fact, taste heterogeneity is a factor working against dispersion
when the distribution of rms is even but it is a factor working against agglomeration
when the distribution of rm is uneven. To be more precise, under taste heterogeneity, the
spatial sorting of entrepreneurs acts as a force that entices the low-demand rms not to
co-agglomerate with high-demand rms in the core countries.
4.2 Trade costs
Given the above analysis, it is easy to discuss the impact of trade costs on the location
of rms. We know that, when  2 ( sustain;  0), entrepreneurs fully agglomerate under
homogenous taste whereas they fully agglomerate under taste heterogeneity. Also, when  
 o, rms evenly disperse under homogenous taste but never do so under taste heterogeneity.
So, the equilibrium spatial distribution of rms implies less dispersion than under taste
heterogeneity if  is large enough and less agglomeration if  is small enough.
In addition, it interesting to study the impact of trade costs on the equilibrium location
pattern. In particular, it is known that the globalization process in the last century has trig-
gered a fall in trade costs and trade barriers  . Under homogenous taste for manufacturing
varieties, a fall in trade cost around  o dramatically alters the location pattern of rms from
even dispersion to full agglomeration. This is because expression (16) is multiplicative of
(2nH  1) when  = 0. However, taste heteoregenity implies a term  in the expression (16)
that is not multiplicative of (2nH 1). As a result, dramatic changes in the location of rms
vanish. We summarize those results in the following proposition:
Proposition 9 Suppose that the location equilibrium is unique. Then,
(i) as trade cost falls from  =  trade to 0, the equilibrium spatial distribution of entrepre-
neurs continuously moves from asymmetric dispersion to full agglomeration.
(ii) Compared to the case of homogenous taste (a = a = a), the equilibrium spatial distrib-
ution of entrepreneurs under taste heterogeneity involves less dispersion if  >  0 and less
agglomeration if  2 ( sustain;  0).
We nally study the impact of changes in the distribution of taste across varieties.
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4.3 Taste distribution and rmslocation
We rst discuss the impact of a parallel shift of the taste distribution. Suppose again that
two taste distributions F 1 and F
2
 so that F
2
(x)  F 1(x   ) 8x 2 [; ] and  > 0. We
know from our previous analysis that b2(v) = b1(v)    so that ba1(v)   a1 = ba2(v)   a2;
G1(n

H) = G2(n

H). From this it readily comes that M1(nH) =
R 1
1 nH (ba1(v)  a1) dv =R 1
1 nH (ba2(v)  a2) dv = M2(nH) so that 1(nH) = 2(nH). As a consequence, a parallel
shift in the taste distribution does not alter the location equilibrium.
Proposition 10 In the footloose entrepreneur model, a parallel shift in the taste distribution
does not alter the location equilibrium.
We secondly study in more detail the impact of a mean-preserving increase in the spread
of the taste distribution. First, it is readily observed that, holding a constant, the sustain
point  sustain decreases with larger value for a   a, which is an indicator of a larger spread
of the demand size distribution. So, a larger spread in the demand size distribution reduces
the set of parameters for which full agglomeration is sustainable.
Second, it is interesting to consider the case of a uniform taste distribution with density
f = 1= so that b(v) = + (v   1=2) where  measures the spreadof the taste distribution
and  1 its density. Then, one computes that G(nH) = (b + c) (1=2  nH), M(nH) =
1
2
(b+ c)nH (1  nH) so that
(nH) =
1
2
 (b+ c)
 
5nH   5n2H   1

(17)
Note that this polynomial is positive at nH = 1=2 and negative at nH = 1 and that it has a
unique root nH = 12 +
1
10
p
5 ' 0:72 on the interval (1=2; 1]. Therefore, we get (nH)  0 if
nH 2 (0:5; 0:72] and (nH) < 0 if nH 2 (0:72; 1]. The value of this polynomial is multiplied
by the spread of the taste distribution . So, an increase in  raises the e¤ect of taste
heterogeneity in expression (16). The question is about the direction of this e¤ect. The
answer is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 11 Suppose a uniform taste distribution. Then, an increase in the spread of
this distribution increases the number of entrepreneurs and varieties in the larger country
(up to nH = 0:72) if  > 
0 but reduces it (down to nH = 0:72) if 
sustain <  <  0.
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Hence, the impact of a spread of the taste distribution depends on the value of trade
costs. In any case, a larger spread in this distribution implies a relocation of entrepreneurs
towards the partial agglomeration pattern where nH = 0:72. This corresponds to the spatial
distribution of rms when the trade cost is just equal to  0.
5 Heterogenous taste and heterogenous cost
In the above model, consumers have varying willingness to pay for the varieties whereas rms
incur the same variable cost to produce each of them. In reality, more valuable varieties
often o¤er more characteristics and have stronger technological and/labor content than less
valuable ones. So, more valuable varieties cost more to rms and can become less attractive.
One may wonder whether the combination of heterogenous taste and cost still yields the same
qualitative results as in the previous section. Towards this aim, we focus on the particular
case where the preference for and the cost of varieties are positively correlated.
For the sake of the argument, let the taste parameter b(v) represents the number of
characteristics embedded in a specic products. Consumers demand more the products
with higher b(v) because they o¤er a larger spectrum of characteristics. For simplicity, let
m 2 [0; 1) be the production cost of a single characteritic. So, the marginal cost of producing
variety v is equal to bm(v) = mb(v).. Under this specication, one can compute that the
prot maximizing price of a variety v (see expression (9)) is augmented by the constantbm(v)=2 and each price indices Pi by m(b+ c)=(2b+ c). In the footloose capital model, one
computes the rent di¤erential for the rm producing variety v as
r(v) =
L (b+ c)
2 (2b+ c)
2664
(2b+ c) (2H   1) (ba(v)  a) (1 m)
+ (2H   1) (b+ c) (2a (1 m)  bt)
 c (b+ c) (nH   1=2)
3775
This expression very similar to (14) and it is is equal to it when m = 0. It is obvious that
rmsself-selection takes place in the same way as before even if higher value products are
more costly. Results are thus qualitatively the same. The cost of characteristics m has
nevertheless the following additional impact on the capitalistslocation incentives. On the
one hand, a higher cost m diminishes the rmsincentives to locate in the large country (see
the second term). On the other hand, it also reduces the idiosyncratic advantage of best
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quality rms (see the rst term). This is because the product value saved by locating in the
larger market is smaller when quality is costly.
In the footloose entrepreneur model, location equilibrium is determined by the above rent
di¤erential plus the consumer surplus di¤erential. As before, the entrepreneurs consumer
surplus does not depend on the idiosyncratic taste of his/her variety. So, the spatial sorting of
entrepreneurs is again given by the above rent di¤erential. The consumer surplus di¤erential
can then be computed as
SH   SF = 1
2
 (2nH   1) [2a (1 m) +mac=b  b ] (b+ c)
2
(2b+ c)2
+
 (1 +m)
2
M(nH)
This expression similar to (15) and reduces to it when m = 0. The cost m introduces several
additional e¤ects. On the one hand, it reduces the aggregate economic value of goods and
therefore the consumer surplus di¤erential (see the term a (1 m)). However, this e¤ect
can be compensated by a pro-competitive e¤ect. Indeed, the cost m increases the consumer
surplus di¤erential as the varieties become better substitutes (see the term mac=b for large
enough c). This pro-competitive e¤ect is explained by the fact that higher costs induce rms
to raise their prices and hit a more elastic portion of their demand curves. So, the price
increases are smaller than the respective increase in the cost m. On the other hand, an
increase in the cost m exarcerbates the consumers benet of entrepreneurssorting process
in the larger country (see the term (1+m)
2
M(nH)). Although high value products are more
costly to produce and sell at a higher price, the rmsmark-up and the consumer surplus
of each high value product are larger. So, a closer supply of higher value goods benet
consumers and therefore entrepreneurs.
6 Conclusion
Product quality has been long studied as an important issue in the international trade litera-
ture. Existing theoretical and empirical studies have studied the relationship between trade
patterns and the quality of imports. In contrast with this literature, this paper investigates
the rmslocation in an economic geography model where consumers value di¤erently the
product variety produced by each rm. Our model extends Ottaviano et al. (2002) to
taste heterogeneity across varieties. Our line of research contrasts with the trade literature
on quality and on cost heterogeneity as it stresses the role of spatial selection and rms
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location rather than the role of export strategy and the resulting trade pattern. In our set-
ting, large markets attract the rms that produce the most valuable varieties; the tougher
competition in those markets entices the other rms to locate in small markets.
We obtain several interesting results. We show that rms selling the higher added value
goods sort out into the region hosting the largest number of consumers. Larger countries thus
get better access to the products that consumers value and demand more intensively. We also
show that the e¤ect of spatial selection on rmsspatial distribution crucially depends on the
properties of the taste distribution across varieties. Finally, we show that taste heterogeneity
smooths the agglomeration patterns but that it should be considered neither as a dispersion
force nor as an agglomeration force. Indeed, the introduction of taste heterogeneity makes
an initially dispered economy less dispersed and an initially agglomerated economy less
agglomerated.
The present model can be extended in several ways. For instance, cost heterogeneity and
beachhead type of export cost à la Melitz (2003) could be added to our taste heterogeneity
model. The relationship between export behaviors and quality could be carefully explored.
Also, empirical tests of our theoretical results could be performed with trade data or regional
price data in the same way as Foster et al. (2008).
References
[1] Baldwin, R.E. (2005). Heterogeneous Firms and Trade: Testable and Untestable Prop-
erties of the Melitz Model, NBER Working Paper, 11471.
[2] Baldwin, R.E and T. Okubo, 2006. Heterogeneous rms, agglomeration and economic
geography: spatial selection and sorting, Journal of Economic Geography, 6(3), pp.
323-346.
[3] Baldwin R.E. and F. Robert-Nicoud (2008). Trade and growth with heterogenous rms,
Journal of International Economics 74(1), pp.21-34.
[4] Baldwin R.E. and J.Harigan (2008). Zeros, Quality and Space: Trade Theory and Trade
Evidence, NBER Working Paper 1321.
[5] Bernard, A.B., J. Eaton, J.B. Jensen and S. Kortum (2003) Plants and Productivity in
International Trade, American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 4, September, 1268-1290.
25
[6] Bernard, A, B. Jensen, and P. Schott (2003). Falling Trade Costs, Heterogeneous Firms
and Industry Dynamics, CEPR Discussion Papers.
[7] Cabral, L. M. B. and J. Mata (2001), On the Evolution of the Firm Size Distribution:
Facts and Theory, American Economic Review 93(4), pp 1075-1090.
[8] Falvey, R. (1981). Commercial Policy and Intra-Industry Trade, Journal of International
Economics, 11, pp. 495-511
[9] Falvey, R., and H. Kierzkowski (1987). Product Quality, Intra-Industry Trade and
(Im)perfect Competition, in: Kierzkowski, H. (Ed.), Protection and Competition in
International Trade, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp.143-161.
[10] Falvey, R., D. Greenaway, and Z. Yu (2004). Intra-industry Trade Between Asymmetric
Countries with Heterogeneous Firms, GEP Working Paper 2004/05.
[11] Feenstra, R. and J. Romalis (2006). A Model of Trade with Quality Choice, University
of California, mimeo.
[12] Flam H. and E.Helpman (1987). Vertical Product Di¤erentiation and North-South
Trade, American Economic Review 77, 810-22.
[13] Foster, L., J.Haltiwanger and C. Syverson (2008). Reallocation, Firm Turnover and
E¢ ciency: Selection on Productivity or Protability, American Economic Review 98(1),
pp 394-425.
[14] Fukao, K, H. Ishido, and K. Ito (2003). Vertical Intra-Industry Trade and Foreign Direct
Investment in East Asia, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies.
[15] Greenaway, D. (1995). Vertical and Horizontal Intra-Industry Trade: A Cross Industry
Analysis for the United Kingdom, Economic Journal, 105, pp. 1505-1518.
[16] Greenaway, D., R. Hine, and C. Milner (1995). Vertical and Horizontal Intra-Industry
Trade: A Cross Industry Analysis for the United Kingdom, Economic Journal, vol.105,
November, pp.15051518.
[17] Hallak, J. C. (2006). Product Quality and the Direction of Trade, Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 68(1), pp. 238-265.
26
[18] Haskel, J and H.Wolf (2001). The law of one price -a case study, Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, 103 (4), pp.545-558.
[19] Head, K and T.Mayer, (2000). Non-Europe: the magnitude and causes of market frag-
mentation in Europe, Weltwirtschftliches Archiv 136 (2), pp. 285-314.
[20] Helpman, E., M. Melitz, and S. Yeaple (2004). Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous
Firms, American Economic Review, 94 (1), pp. 300-316.
[21] Hummels, D., and P. J. Klenow (2005). The Variety and Quality of a Nations Exports,
American Economic Review, 95(3), pp. 704-23.
[22] Khandelwal, A. (2007). The Long and Shirt (of) Quality Ladders,
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/akhandelwal/research.html.
[23] Krugman, P.: Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy
99, 483-499 (1991)
[24] Linder, S. (1961). An Essay on Trade and Transformation, Almqvist andWiksell, Stock-
holm.
[25] Melitz, M.(2003). The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity, Econometrica, vol. 71(6), pp.1695-1725.
[26] Melitz, M., and G.I.P. Ottaviano (2008) Market size, trade, and productivity. Review
of Economic Studies 75, 295-316.
[27] Mossay, P.: Stability of spatial adjustments across local exchange economies. Regional
Science and Urban Economics 36, 431-449 (2006)
[28] Murphy, K., and A. Shleifer (1997). Quality and Trade, Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 53, pp. 1-15.
[29] Okubo, T. (2007). Intra-Industry Trade, Reconsidered: The Role of Technology Transfer
and Foreign Direct Investment, World Economy, 30(12), pp. 1855-1876.
[30] Okubo, T. (2008). Firm Heterogeneity and Ricardian Comparative advantage within
and across sectors, Economic Theory, forthcoming.
27
[31] Ottaviano G.I.P., T. Tabuchi and J-F. Thisse, (2002). Agglomeration and Trade Revis-
ited, International Economic Review, vol. 43(2), 409-436.
[32] Ottaviano, G.I.P. and J.-F. Thisse (2004). Agglomeration and economic geography. In
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Volume 4. ed. J.V. Henderson and J.-F.
Thisse.
[33] Pavcnik, N. (2002). Trade liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvement: Evidence
from Chilean Plants, Review of Economic Studies, 69 (1): pp.245-276.
[34] Schott, P. (2004). Across-Product versus Within-Product Specialization in International
Trade, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2), pp. 647-78.
[35] Stockey, N. L. (1991). The Volume and Composition of Trade Between Rich and Poor
Countries, Review of Economic Studies, 58, pp. 63-80.
[36] Syverson, C. (2004). Market structure and productivity: a concrete example. Journal
of Political Economy 112, 1181-1222.
[37] Syverson, C. (2007). Prices, spatial competition, heterogeneous producers: an empirical
test. Journal of Industrial Economics 55, 197-222.
[38] Tabuchi T. and Thisse J-F (2001). Taste Heterogeneity, Labour Mobility and Economic
Geography, CEPR Discussin Paper 3114.
[39] Tybout, J. and D. Westbrook (1995). Trade liberalization and Dimensions of E¢ ciency
Change in Mexican Manufacturing Industries, Journal of International Economics 39:
pp. 53-78.
Appendix 1: Consumer surplus
Consumer surplus: The consumer surplus in country i is equal to
Si =
Z 1
0
b(v)qi(v)dv      
2
Z 1
0
[qi(v)]
2dv   
2
Z 1
0
qi(v)dv
2
 
Z 1
0
pi(v)qi(v)dv
This can be written as
Si =
1
2
Z 1
0
qi(v)

2b(v)  (   ) qi(v)   Z 1
0
qi()d   2pi(v)

dv
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where, using the rst order condition of the consumer decision (3) we successively get
Si =
1
2
Z 1
0
qi(v) fb(v)  pi(v)g dv
=
1
2 (   )
Z 1
0
b(v)   Z 1
0
qi()d   pi(v)

fb(v)  pi(v)g dv
Substituting the integral
R 1
0
qi()d by (4) in the last expression and expanding it, we obtain
the following expression on consumer surplus as a function of prices only:
2 (   )Si =
Z 1
0
b(v)2dv   2Z 1
0
b(v)pi(v)dv + Z 1
0
pi(v)
2dv   

(  Pi)2
We now substitute  by 1=b and  by c= [b (b+ c)] and we use the inverse of equality ba(v) =b(v) (b+ c) c and we use the denitions of the means, a = b; and the variance, var[ba(v)] R 1
0
(ba(v)2   a2) dv = (b+ c)2 R 1
0
(b(v)2   2)dv to get
Si =
var [ba(v)]
2 (b+ c)
 
Z 1
0
[ba(v)pi(v)  aPi]dv + a2
2b
  aPi + b+ c
2
Z 1
0
pi(v)
2dv   c
2
P2i
Because
R 1
0
[ba(v)pi(v)  aPi]dv = R 10 [ba(v)  a]pi(v)dv, we can write
Si =
a2
2b
  aPi + b+ c
2
Z 1
0
pi(v)
2dv   c
2
P2i  
Z 1
0
[ba(v)  a]pi(v)dv + var [ba(v)]
2 (b+ c)
(18)
Consumer surplus di¤erential: We now derive the surplus di¤erential SH(v)   SF (v).
One can write the consumer surplus (18) for the case of two countries as
Si(v) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
a2
2b
+ var[ba]
2(b+c)
 a
hR
Vi pii()di() +
R
Vj pji()dj()
i
+ b+c
2
nR
Vi [pii()]
2 di() +
R
Vj [pji()]
2 dj()
o
  c
2
hR
Vi pii()di() +
R
Vj pji()dj()
i2
 
hR
Vi [ba()  a]pii()di() + RVj [ba()  a]pji()dj()i
or equivalently
Si(v) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
a2
2b
+ var[ba]
2(b+c)
 aPi
+ b+c
2
nR
Vi [pii()]
2 di() +
R
Vj [pji()]
2 dj()
o
  c
2
P2i
 
hR
Vi [ba()  a]pii()di() + RVj [ba()  a]pji()dj()i
(19)
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where i() is the measure of variety  on the set Vi and where Pi =
R
Vi pii()di() +R
Vj pji()dj(). This expression is independent of the variety produced by the entrepreneur,
; so that his/her surplus and surplus di¤erential are independent of : Si(v)  Si and
SH(v)  SF (v)  SH   SF . We successively derive the surplus di¤erential SH   SF for each
term of expression (19).
Since the rst term in expression (19) is a constant it does not impact on the surplus
di¤erential. Using (10) and (11), the sum of the second term and fourth terms in expression
(19) yields
 

aPH +
c
2
P2H

+

aPF +
c
2
P2F

=   (PH   PF )

a+
c
2
(PH + PF )

=  (b+ c) (nF   nH)
2b+ c

a+
c
2
2a+ (b+ c)
2b+ c

=  (nH   nF ) (4a+ c) (b+ c)
2
2 (2b+ c)2
Third, the last term in the bracket of expression (19) writes asZ
Vi
[ba()  a] poii + ba(v)  a2 (b+ c)

di() +
Z
Vj
[ba()  a] poii + ba(v)  a2 (b+ c) + 2

dj()
where we have dened
poii 
1
2
2a+ njc
2b+ c
This can be re-written as
poii
Z
V
(ba()  a)d() + 1
2 (b+ c)
Z
V
[ba()  a]2d() + 
2
Z
Vj
(ba()  a)dj()
where () is the measure of variety  on the set V which is independent of . The rst term
of this expression is nil and the second term is a constant. So, the contribution of this term
in the surplus di¤erential SH   SF is simply equal to
 M(nH)
where
M(nH) =
1
2
Z
VH
(ba()  a) dH()  1
2
Z
VF
(ba()  a) dF ()
Given that best highest demand varieties sort in country H, VH = fv : ba(v) > ba(1 nH)g =
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(1  nH ; 1], we can sequentially write
M(nH) =
1
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Finally, the curly bracket in the third term of expression (19) can be written asZ
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This expression simplies to
(poii)
2 + 0 +
var[ba]
[2 (b+ c)]2
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Z
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So, the contribution of this term in the surplus di¤erential SH   SF is equal to
(poHH)
2   (poFF )2 +  (poHHnF   poFFnH) 

b+ c
M(nH) +
 2
4
(nF   nH)
After plugging the values of (poHH ; p
o
FF ) we get
 (nF   nH) (b+ c) 2a+  (b+ c)
(2b+ c)2
  
b+ c
M(nH)
Adding up those terms we get
SH   SF = 1
2
 (nH   nF ) (2a  b)

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2b+ c
2
+
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2
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Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 5
(i) For the sake of clarity, let us dene n001 and n
00
2 where G1(n
00
1) = G2(n
00
2) = 0. One can
show that n001 > n
00
2 and that G1(n
00
2) > 0 > G2(n
00
1). So, the di¤erence G2   G1 is equal to
1   2 > 0 at nH = 0 and nH = 1 whereas it is equal to  G1(n02) < 0 at nH = n002 and to
G2(n
00
1) < 0 at nH = n
00
1. The di¤erence G2   G1 thus changes its sign (at least) two times
(there should be a way to prove that it changes its signs only two times). Therefore let us
dene by n01 and n
0
2, 1 > n
0
1 > n
0
2 > 0, be the two zeros of G2 G1. So, the di¤erence G2 G1
is negative if and only if nH 2 [n01; n02]. From this we can readily conclude that the impact
of a rst-order-stochastic dominant change in the quality distribution reduces agglomeration
(nH2 < n

H1) if and only if n

H1 2 [n01; n02].
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 8
We need to show that the function V (nH) has at most one root on the interval (1=2; 1].
Because lim"!0V (1=2+") > 0 a su¢ cient condition is that the functionV (nH) is concave
on (1=2; 1]. This will be true if the function (nH) is also concave on this interval. Using
M 0 = G, we successively get that
0 = 3G+ (2nH   1)G0
00 = 5G0 + (2nH   1)G00
For 00 < 0 on the interval (1=2; 1], we must have that  5G0 > (2nH   1)G00 for all nH 2
(1=2; 1]. Since G0 < 0, this is true if G00 < 0. If G00 > 0, a su¢ cient condition is simply
that  5G0 > G00 for all nH 2 (1=2; 1]. Since G0(nH) =  (b + c)b0(1   nH) and G00(nH) =
(b+ c)b00(1  nH). As a result, a su¢ cient condition for a concave (nH) is that
5b0(1  nH) > b00(1  nH) (21)
for all nH 2 (1=2; 1]. That is b is not a too convex function and, by the same token, F is not a
too concave function. The su¢ cient condition (21) applies for uniform taste distribution since
this implies that F 00 = b00 = 0. It indeed applies for taste Pareto distribution F = 1 (x=) k
provided that it has a nite average; that is, if k > 1. In this case, b =  (1  v) 1=k so that
condition (21) becomes 5nH > (1 + 1=k), which is true for all nH 2 (1=2; 1] and k > 1.
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7 Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 11
To prove Proposition 11, suppose that  =  0 so that the rst term in expression (16) is
equal to zero. This case is displayed in panel (b) of Figure 3. The location equilibrium is
simply given by the zero of the above polynomial (17); that is, by nH = 0:72. When the
spread  rises, the polynomial (17) increases for nH < 0:72 and falls for nH > 0:72. Suppose
now that  >  0 so that expression (16) smaller than (17) for any nH > 1=2. As it can
be seen in panel (a) of Figure 3, the number of entrepreneurs nH is smaller than 0:72 and
increases with larger spread . The opposite argument applies when  <  0. So a rise in 
implies a convergence of the equilibrium distribution of entrepreneurs to nH = 0:72.
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